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that would be entirely immune from the ill-placed 
ingenuity of bankers there is no point in doing so. 
This is a much higher benchmark than we apply 
to almost any other tax. One of the principal sources 
of tax revenues in the United States is income 
tax, but the last study by the IRS suggested that 
non-compliance with the tax code amounted to 
$345bn and 18-19% of income was not properly 
reported to the IRS. Other studies suggest this 
number has grown to $500bn2. Yet this non-com-
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abandoning income tax collection altogether.
Eighty two percent compliance is not as good as 
it should be but the $2,000bn that is actually 
raised and spent is not to be dismissed. An 
important aim in the design of FTTS must be to 
minimize avoidance and evasion, but there 
should be an acceptance that minimizing it to 
zero is not practical for any tax.
Legal Enforceability 
and Stamp Duties
The way to minimize tax avoidance and tax 
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same as with all taxes and other white-collar 
crimes. It was well described over dinner by 
Botswana President, Festus Mogae, as turning 
the undesired activity from a high return, low risk 
venture, into a low return, high risk one. In the 
case of FTT, this means a low tax rate coupled 
with high consequences of non-compliance.
Across the world where ‘stamp taxes’ are col-
lected3, a non-taxed, and therefore non-stamped 
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so there can be no registered change of ownership 
until taxes are paid to, and stamped by, the authori-
ties. These stamp taxes are collected at settlement 
where change in registered ownership takes place. 
They are a levy on the transfer of legal ownership 
not the transactions per se. Non-enforceability of 
contract is a very high consequence of non-compli-
ance with the stamp duty. It is particularly so where 
registered owners of assets are due to receive 
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holder meetings, dividends, interest coupons, 
rights issues or buy-outs. 
 
New Regulatory Requirements 
and Central Clearing 
Instruments that are non-taxed, and are 
therefore not legally enforced, cannot be 
considered eligible for central clearing by a clear-
ing house. This is of crucial importance today. It 
represents one of the ways that FTTs are more 
feasible than ever before. One of the responses 
by the G20 and the Financial Stability Board to 
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that all exchange-traded instruments (including 
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1-  Senior Fellow, London Business School, Emeritus Professor of Gresham College and Chairman, Intelligence Capital Limited.
Many people contributed to the background research to this paper, especially, Richard Gower. 
2-  See Richard Cebula and Edgar Feige “America’s Underground Economy: Measuring the size, Growth and Determinants of Tax 
Evasion in the US. (http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/econ/archive/wp2011-1.pdf)
3-  Stamp taxes have a long tradition in many countries including Malaysia, Netherlands, Ireland, Israel, UK and the US.
Avinash Persaud1
4equities, bonds, derivatives and all vanilla over-
the-counter transactions such as CDS) must be 
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instruments that are not centrally cleared will 
incur a capital adequacy requirement4.
The consequences therefore of holding non-
taxed instruments in terms of loss of legal cer-
tainty, higher counter-party risk, loss of gains 
from netting in a clearing house, and the cost of 
higher capital adequacy requirements for hold-
ing them, are quite substantial. It is estimated 
that over 70% of OTC credit derivatives will be 
centrally cleared and those that are not, are 
highly bespoke complex contracts that the clear-
ers refuse to accept and as a result are more 
expensive for investors to hold. These non-cen-
trally cleared instruments would still, of course, 
be subject to the tax and the underlying con-
tracts would be unenforceable if the transfer of 
ownership was not stamped by the tax authori-
ties. Even if an investor were prepared to take all 
of the risks – for the sake of saving a small frac-
tion of one percent – they would then have to 
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exit from their investment with a return. Non-
compliance will be a high-risk venture. Too high 
a risk, to be sure, for the banks, insurance com-
panies, pension funds and mutual funds that 
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To be resistant to evasion and avoidance, it 
would be best for a FTT to be a small, stamp tax 





	

unenforceability of contract for unstamped 
transactions. 
Optimal Size, Elasticities 
and Distortions
A small tax will reduce the potential of eco-
nomic distortions. One way of measuring 
this is estimating the elasticity of demand to 
changes in transaction costs – the amount that 
demand for an instrument will fall following a rise 
in transaction costs – caused by anything, 
including higher clearing house fees or an FTT. 
Our intention, so as to minimize distortions, 
would be not to change substantially the under-
lying demand for instruments. A number of stud-
ies have tried to estimate the price elasticitiesof 
one country imposing a transaction tax5. These 
studies indicate that the elasticities of demand 
for equities, for example, are in the region of 
0.25 to 1.65, averaging around 1.0 so that a 1% 
rise in costs will lead to a 1% fall in volume. 
This is a small elasticity of demand. It is likely to 
be an under-estimation of the effect of larger 
than 1.0% rises in stamp taxes, but also likely to 
be an over-estimation of the effect of much 
smaller rises. Below a certain size of transaction 
costs, the level of general uncertainties, includ-
ing the likelihood of the asset price changing 
during the transaction period, means that there 
comes a point where thegains from a further 
reduction in transaction costs cannot be reliably 
obtained and yield marginal impact. (Similarly, 
because of these uncertainties, the investment 
literature generally shows that where nothing 
else changes, small changes in the short-term 
cost of capital, like the ones we are discussing 
here, have little impact on investment demand6.)
The effect on demand of an instrument will also 
depend on a number of other factors that the 
studies on elasticities tend to neglect. Elasticity 
of demand would be smaller the more related 
countries, participate, thereby reducing the sub-
stitution effect captured in the studies. Further, 
the elasticity would be depend on who the inves-
tor is. The elasticity of demand for a volatile 
instrument, by a long-term investor who is hedg-
ing this volatility across time, from a small rise in 
transaction costs, would be far smaller than the 
elasticity of demand for instruments with gener-
ally lower, volatility, of high-frequency traders. 
Commentators have argued that it is customers 
who ultimately pay the tax. This is correct. However 
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equally. Long-term equity investors who roll over 
their portfolio once or twice a year will pay least and 
will be least affected, while short-term speculators 
4-  The Communique, issued after the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh in September 2009, states: “all standardized OTC 
derivatives contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through 
central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest,” “OTC derivatives contracts should be reported to trade repositories,” and 
“non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital requirements.”
5-  For a recent review of the results of these studies, see McCulloch and Pacillo (2010).
6-  For an interesting study on the elasticities of investment in general to transaction taxes where the potential for substitution is 
high, see “Taxes, the Cost of Capital, and Investment:A Comparison of Canada and the United States.” Kenneth J. McKenzie 
and Aileen J. Thompson, April 1997.
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5who roll over their portfolios several times a year, 
and are speculating on Government interest rates 
or currencies where transaction costs are currently 
low and elasticities are higher, will pay the most. 
This is considered an attractive feature by many 
and was one of the arguments used originally by 
John Maynard Keynes and James Tobin in argu-
ing for transaction taxes7.Their intention was to 
cause a distortion to demand for instruments not 
to shy away from it.The counter-argument is that 
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soon after the crisis this is a seductive argument. 
But it is somewhat specious. While high turnover 
 	    

 
	
liquidity is ultimately about diversity. Liquidity 
exists where when you want to sell, someone 
else wants to buy, because they have a different 
valuation or investment goal or strategy. Algo-
rithmic high-frequency trading is primarily trend 
following so that they are buyers when markets 
are rising and sellers when markets are falling, 
which reduces diversity and saps liquidity.8
Taxing Different Instruments
To reduce substitution, not penalize one 
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ments. The non-enforceability rule or inability to 
clear unstamped instruments would bite just as 
hard for a contract for difference as it would for an 
equity purchase. But it would be wrong to tax all 
instruments to the same extent. Across different 
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general terms, their underlying elasticity or short-
term volatility so as to reduce potential economic 
distortions. The tax should be highest where the 
elasticity is low and demand will be relatively unaf-
fected, and lowest where the elasticity is highest 
and demand would be more affected9. 
Analysis of different elasticities10 suggests that a 
reasonable range, erring on the side of caution, 
of the ratio of the tax in equities, bonds and 
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ties to long-dated bonds, and two to one from 
long-dated bonds to short-dated bonds. Hence, 
if there were a 0.50% tax on equities, the tax on 
long dated bonds would be 0.1% and the tax on 
short-dated bills, swaps and futures would be 
0.05%. This analysis on the optimal size of the 
tax resonates with those transaction taxes that 
currently exist and appear most successful. It 
should be noted that a majority of foreign 
exchange transactions involve an underlying 
equity, bond or other instrument that would be 
stamped, with bonds and bills playing a particu-
larly important role for those seeking the cur-
rency market “carry trade”. Consequently, 
extending the tax to bonds would effectively 
extend it to the currency markets.  
Existing FTTs
Today, around $23bn is raised annually, by 
just seven countries, through FTTs. Almost 
half of this revenue is raised by the UK and 
South Korea alone where both have a 0.5% 
stamp duty on equities only – see table 1.
The ‘revealed preference’ from those countries 
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are consistent with the analysis above: 
(1)  tax rates of 0.5% or below are not so high as 
to cause severe distortions or substantial 
avoidance and evasion, though as indicated 
earlier,some avoidance is expected; 
 
(2)  existing tax rates are not at the wrong end of 
the Laffer curve. At these rates, the higher 
the rate, the greater the revenue; 
 
(3)  tax rates levied on equity transactions are higher 
than on bonds by a multiple of 3 or 5 to 1. It is 
interesting to note that the ratio of equity to 
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7-  One of the observations of Adair Turner, Chairman of the FSA, shared by others, is that the collapse of transaction costs 
towards zero, facilitated the creation of huge derivative markets balancing on relatively small underlying markets, which made 


			
	
#	
		


	
		&#	
a supporter of transaction taxes.  
8-  This destabilizing behaviour is well described in “Positive feedback investment strategies and destabilizing rational speculation”, 
J. Bradford de Long, A. Shleifer, L. H.Summers and R. Waldman, Journal of Finance, June 1990. 
9-  This principle which maximizes the tax take, or producers surplus is also known as “Ramsey Pricing” after Ramsey (1927) and 
Edgeworth (1910). 
10-  See, Pollin, Baker and Schaberg, (2003).
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6Past taxing of bonds has been a little fraught, 
principally because bonds were traded over-the-
counter, more bonds were bearer instruments, 
and short-dated bonds were cash-like. However, 
as cited above the universal trend towards trade-
reporting, greater registered ownership under 

"	
	
"	
		
and now central clearing and settlement, makes 
the task of taxing bonds similar to that of equi-
ties, while we must recognize, that lower volatili-
ties, lower elasticities and lower trading spreads 
point to a lower tax rate than for equities.
Country STT Revenue ($bn) STT rates for different assets
Equity Bonds/Loans Options Futures
Capital 
Levy
Hong Kong 2.79 10 basis points
India 1.22
0.25% on stock 
rice; 0.025% 
on intraday 
transactions; 
local stamp 
taxes may also 
apply
Local stamp 
duties may 
apply
0.017% 
on premium; 
0.125% 
on strike
0.017% of 
delivery price
South Korea 6.08
0.5% on value 
of shares in 
corporations or 
partnerships
0.1-0.4% tax 
on capital 
formation
South Africa 1.41
0.25% of value; 
new share 
issues excluded
Switzerland 2
15 bps on 
domestic 
shares;  
30 bps on 
foreign shares
6-12 bps on 
bond issuance
1% on share 
issuance 
in excess of 
CHF 1 mn.
Taiwan 3.3
30 basis points 10 basis points 
on corporate 
bond principal
10-60 basis 
points on 
premiums
Up to 0.025 
basis points 
on interest rate 
futures; up to 
6 basis points on 
stock index and 
other futures
UK 5.86
Stamp duty 
0.5% on 
secondary 
sales of shares 
and trusts 
holding share
50 bps  
on strike price, 
if executed
50 bps on 
delivery price, 
if delivered
Total 22.66
SELECTION OF EXISTING STTS
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Data is for 2009 for Hong Kong and Taiwan, for 2008 for India, South Africa and the UK, and for 2007 for all other countries (South Korea and 
Switzerland).
7Section 31 Fees – US 
Securities Transaction Taxes
The table above ignores transaction taxes 
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related, regulatory functions. Arguably, except 
for how the funds are used, these ‘fees’ have 
	
	
		


		
as transaction taxes. Therefore the true collec-
tion of securities transaction taxes and fees 
around the world annually is likely to be far 
higher than $23bn. 
The US SEC, the securities regulator, is self-
funded by a transaction tax on the volume traded 
on exchanges. Many who rile against transac-
tion taxes and argue that slight taxes will exact 
huge disrepair to markets are often unfamiliar 
with the fact that, without the sky falling upon us, 
the US SEC charges a 0.00257% tax on trans-
actions that today raises $1bn annually to fund 
the SEC. This tax, so-called ‘Section 31 fees’, 
is named after Section 31 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 193411 which empowers the 
SEC to exact such a levy. These fees were 
raised in 2010 from 0.0017% and are likely to 
rise again given the additional expenditure of the 
SEC. Clearing houses also charge fees of simi-
lar order on transactions (buying and selling)12.  
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fallen and risen over time. Stamp taxes are old, 
common taxes13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the sector convinced us that nothing should 
stand in the way of more trading, some of these 
taxes were taken off or moderated as their yield 
grew large, as was the case of the US securities 
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Brazil. More recently some have been returned. 
History has shown therefore that this is a policy 
that can be tried, and, if it proves too costly, 
reversed relatively easily and quickly. The US 
Section 31 fees have been lowered nine times 
and raised seven times since 1934 without stir. 
Proposal
Our analysis and the revealed preference 
of the manner and size of the current $23bn 
of stamp duties argues for a small stamp duty 
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ment, enforced by the threat of uneforcibility of 
contract, with the tax sized in accordance to the 
volatility hierarchy of markets.
A stamp duty of 0.5% on equity transactions, 
0.1% on long-dated bond transactions and 
0.05% on short-dated bond, swap or futures 
transactions, if adopted by France, Germany 
and Spain, would likely yield $15bn per year 
(see tables 2 and 3) from equity and government 
bond markets alone, while causing minimal dis-
tortions and limited avoidance. 
These funds can be raised independently of 
other countries following suit. However, such a 
lead could be accompanied by a commitment of 
others to follow suit. These taxes can be pre-
sented as the way the countries raising them will 
meet their international obligations and others 
are welcome to follow or to present alternative 
plans, but doing nothing is not an option. 
Within the G20, four countries already have 
FTTs – South Africa, South Korea, India and UK. 
There would appear to be interest in other G20 
countries such as Mexico, Argentina, Indonesia, 
Turkey and Australia to introduce transaction 
taxes. Brazil’s Congress leaders and President 
have signaled that it will re-impose a 0.38% tax 
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health initiatives. India and South Africa could 
be persuaded to raise their transaction taxes to 
a new international target. Wider participation 
could raise the collection to over $20bn but those 
that would make most difference remain France 
and Germany.
11-  Under Section 31 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, self-regulatory organizations (SROs) – such as the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and all of the national securities exchanges (including the New York Stock Exchange 
and the American Stock Exchange) – must pay transaction fees to the SEC based on the volume of securities that are sold on 
their markets. These fees recover the costs incurred by the government, including the SEC, for supervising and regulating the 
securities markets and securities professionals.
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8GOVERNMENT DEBT
Revenue ($m) Market Turnover ($m)
Germany  1,588 6,580,000
Euronext Paris  1,348 5,586,000
Euronext Amsterdam  845 3,500,000
Euronext Brussels  1,569 6,500,000
Euronext Lisbon  362 1,500,000
Spain  845 3,500,000
Totals  6,558 27,166,000
EQUITY MARKETS 
Revenue ($m) Market Turnover ($m)
Germany  3,821 1,528,491
Euronext Paris  3,939 1,575,773
Euronext Amsterdam  1,578 631,378
Euronext Brussels  297 118,616
Euronext Lisbon  148 59,027
Spain  3,760 1,504,052
Totals  13,543 5,417,336
Securities Transaction Tax rate 0.10%
Elasticity of size to transactions costs -3
Pre-tax transactions costs 0.17%
Securities Transaction Tax rate 0.50%
Elasticity of size to transactions costs -1
Pre-tax transactions costs 0.50%
* Data on turnover comes from Euronext for equities and National Treasuries for exchange and OTC Government bond turnover, except for the Dutch 
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end of the range. Elasticity estimates and revenue formula come from McCulloch &Pacillo (2010). All data are converted to dollars using a rate 
of $1.45.
9Conclusion
There are to my knowledge no other inno-
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would yield this scale of funding for development 
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the one time opportunity to wrestle and beat 
some of the biggest public health ailments that 
so debilitate social and economic development 
in the world’s poorest countries. 
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ciaries of globalization, as a consequence, the 
sector has far outstripped the growth of the world 
economy and grown from around $3trn in 1985 
to over $100trn today – despite the global credit 
crunch. Industry forecasts suggest the sector – 
growing rapidly in emerging markets today – will 
touch $200trn within the decade. In turn, globali-
zation has provided a route for the economic 
advancement of many nations. But some coun-
tries, and some communities within other coun-
tries, are being left behind. The growing divide is 
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challenges. These not only cause much human 
misery, they debilitate a country’s productivity, 
rotting away the steps of the ladder out of pov-
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zation to those that are being left behind by it. 
This is a contribution that is small relative to the 
activity of the sector  but large relative to what 
the resources could be used for, and a contribu-
tion that if it were to prove debilitating to markets, 
could be reversed.
Others are better placed to identify what $75bn 
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purpose – such as the elimination of malaria, 
AIDS or tuberculosis. While hypothecation of tax 
revenues would probably face greater obstacles 
than raising them, the legitimacy of the tax will 
be strongly related to what it used for or at least 
ear-marked for from general funds.  In this regard 
it is interesting that few blink at the idea of the 
SEC raising its transaction fees to pay for, hope-
fully, better regulation, or the Clearing Houses, 
raising their transaction fees in response to new 
regulatory requirements designed to reduce sys-
temic risk. There are no long debates on avoid-
ance, liquidity, or the implications of raising the 
cost of capital.
#	
	
				
around FTTs. We conclude that a small stamp 
tax, where contracts are unenforceable if they 
are not taxed and stamped, and where it is 
	


 	

	
$15bn with minimal distortion and avoidance if 
France and Germany and Spain adopt it and sig-

				-
nomics does not get in the way of the development 
argument or the moral case. Others are better 
suited to espouse the moral case, but it would 
seem to me that while the cost of trying would be 
small; the costs of prevaricating, or forever 
promising but never delivering, of waiting till a 
tomorrow that never comes, are enormous.   
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It is often argued that if there is a tax on trans-

 

 	 
	 
-
pants would switch to the derivatives market where 
the tax could not be levied. There are a number of 
reasons why this argument is suspect. 
To begin with it is important to remember that 
there are many ways to evade and avoidthe 
taxes that contribute most to national treasuries: 
income, corporate, capital gains and sales taxes. 
The degree of avoidance of any tax depends in 
part on the size of the tax and the consequences 
of being “caught”. In this case we are arguing 
about a small tax with large consequences if 
they are not paid. These consequences include 
the simple and traditional legal one, where con-
tracts to buy or sell an instrument will be ruled 
unenforceable if the tax has not be paid. This is 
a tough consequence. The major end-owners of 


 	  
 	 
insurance companies and the largest interna-
tional banks could not, for a host of regulatory, 
"

		 
 
 	
 
instruments where their legal enforceability was 
in doubt. Indeed, an untaxed instrument would 
be ineligible for central clearing, a new require-
ment of all vanilla, OTC, derivative instruments, 

	
	
	"		
which would cost the evader several times more 
than the tax. There could be further regulatory 
rules where instruments that were untaxed could 
not count as collateral or capital in the countries 
in which the tax was imposed.  
It is easy to be mesmerized by the notional size 
of derivative markets. The credit derivative swaps 
market for instance is estimated to be $30trn, 
or almost double the size of the US equity. But 
 thesemeasures of size can be an illusionary, 
often represent double-counting of gross notional 
positions while the value of net positions are 
often considerably smaller. Moreover, in most 
cases, derivative activity is not so disconnected 
from the underlying market and so transaction 
taxes would be paid. In large part, though by no 
means exclusively, derivative transactions are 
compliments to the positions in the underlying 
markets, not substitutes. This can be seen in the 
case of equity stamp duties that continue to raise 
large sums, even when they are surrounded by 
highly liquid and large equity derivative markets 
as in the case of the UK, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
India, South Africa and South Korea. 
In many cases a derivative position is a hedge 
against movements in an underlying holding for 
which the tax would have been paid. In cases 
where the derivative is the main focus, investors 
trade in and out of the underlying market – and 
hence would pay the tax – in order to hedge their 
derivative exposures. Imagine, a bank has sold 
a call option on GE shares to an investor so that 
were GE shares to rise above a certain level, the 
bank would be obligated to deliver $100m of GE 
shares to its customer at that level. Imagine that 
after current price action, the probability that the 
bank would have to do so and would be “short” 
$100m of rising GE shares, had risen from 5% to 
50%. In order to limit the bank’s potential loss 
from this derivative contract, the bank would buy 
some GE shares now, and in doing so, would 
pay the tax. The tax would have to be very sub-
stantial, certainly above 1.0%, for the bank to 
decide it would rather expose itself to a multi-
million dollar loss, and collateral call and 
increased capital adequacy requirement than 
pay the tax. 
However, not all derivative transactions will have 
some underlying transaction or series of under-
lying hedging transactions and consequently, 
a tax on the underlying transaction could lead 
DERIVATIVES
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to some substitution to the derivatives markets 
and a loss in tax revenues. Again the incentive to 
substitute will relate to the size of the tax savings 
and the cost of not holding the underlying instru-
ment in terms of lost dividends or not having the 
right to vote in shareholder meetings. In this 
case, the tax authorities could take a leaf out of 
the historical approach to the transaction of 
bearer bonds, and tax the premium on derivative 
transactions at a rate of three times the rate of 
tax on underlying transactions, while giving a tax 
credit where taxes are then further paid in the 
course of hedging the instrument. This could 
also be set up as a withholding tax on the deriva-
tive premia, released in part or in whole if there 
are related, tax-paying transactions in the under-
lying instruments. In the GE case for instance, 
the bank would pay a tax on the premium earned 
for selling the call option on GE stock, and if 
greater taxes were paid in the selling and buying 
of GE stock to hedge this transaction, this tax 
would be returned (or credited against tax due). 
In conclusion, derivatives are less of an obstacle to 


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		
First, derivates are often compliments to the under-
lying markets rather than substitutes and taxes on 
the underlying instruments can  co-exist with healthy 
derivative markets as we already observe. Where 
derivatives are a hedge for an underlying instru-
ment, or are themselves hedged by transactions in 
the underlying transactions a transactions tax 
would be collected. But this is not always the case 
today and may be less so in the future. To avoid 
substitution from the underlying markets to the 
derivative markets to avoid paying the tax, a with-
holding tax can be placed on the premium paid for 
derivative transactions at a “penal” rate of three 
times the normal rate for a transaction (derivative 
premia are far smaller than the notional value of the 
transaction) and this can be refunded in part or in 
whole if there are related, tax-paying transactions in 
the underlying markets. The penalty for avoiding or 
evading the tax would be the same as elsewhere, 
the contract underlying the untaxed instrument 
would be unenforceable in jurisdictions that have 
signed up to the tax which would be a cost and risk 
far outweighing the cost of paying the tax. 
Avinash Persaud
Summer 2011
Opinion: a successful and 
		

transaction tax (M-FTT)
Bruno Jetin14 
The present note highlights some critical 
points for the success of a multilateral 


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matter is that the tax will be naturally incorpo-
rated in the present organisation and working of 


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nomical obstacle to the tax.
1. General features of the M-FTT
The success of the M-FTT depends on its 
scope and simplicity. The M-FTT must be 
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fraud, discrimination between markets and 
	
	
	
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
activities and jobs. The tax rates must be high 
enough to generate substantive revenues and 
no too high to avoid a dramatic reduction of the 
volume of transaction which would run contrary 
to the objective of raising revenues and improv-
	



	
A comprehensive tax
To avoid fraud and discrimination between 
markets, the tax should be applied on all 



	
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currency and commodities. Each exception will 
not only infringe the principle of non-discrimina-
tion, it will also create loopholes and possibilities 
to circumvent the tax on the markets where it is 
levied. By the same token, the tax must apply to 
	 

 	 #	  
revise the Treaty regularly will open the possibil-
	
	

	
The only exception to the rule is the distinction 
between primary and secondary markets for 
bonds and equities but not for other markets 
such as the currency market where such a dis-
tinction is not relevant. On the primary markets, 

		
	 	 	 	
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objective of the tax is not to disturb in any way 
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create jobs. It is not the case of secondary mar-
kets where the same shares and bonds are sold 
again and again to different owners. Quite to the 
contrary, taxing secondary markets makes pos-
sible to tax the practice of share buy-backs which 
is detrimental to job creation because it diverts 
  	 		  
 

encourage investors to keep their bonds and 
shares for a longer period and contributes to 


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are by far the biggest markets where the tax can 
produce important revenues.
A neutral tax 
#
 
 
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 

 -
ments does not mean that the same rate 
will be applied. The tax will be considered as a 
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increase in the transaction cost reduces the 
number of transactions. So the tax rate has to be 
weighed against the pre-tax transaction cost 
which is different according to asset/product and 
market players. To respect the principle of neu-

 			 
	 
 

 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ments, the introduction of the tax should increase 
the transaction cost in the same proportion, 
(from 30% to 50%) in all markets and for all 


	#	

			-
ent for each broad class of instruments (bonds, 
shares, currencies, …) but the effect on the vol-
ume of transactions will be the same. The tax 
rates given in the blueprint are inspired by this 
philosophy and therefore respect the equal treat-
ment principle. 
It follows from what precedes that ideally all 
States should adopt the same tax rates for each 


		
		
		"
tax transaction costs. If not, investors would be 
induced to migrate in the taxing states where tax 
rates are lower. 
A tax that avoids multiple taxation
The fact that the M-FTT is a comprehen-
sive tax creates the risk of taxing the same 
transaction several times. The blueprint pro-
poses the creation of a liberalising electronic tag 


	 


 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
the M-FTT has been paid relieving the other 
intermediaries in the transaction chain, and 
thereby ensuring legal certainty and avoiding 
double and unintentional non-taxation” (p 10). 
This is a major innovation whose importance 
deserves due attention because one of the tradi-
tional critic to the M-FTT is that it is not doable 
for technical reasons. Not only is the electronic 

		
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cient.  Message routing companies such as SWIFT 
can be mobilised to “tag” electronically each 


 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include a lot of detailed information such as the 
identity of the seller and buyer, the name of the 
		
		
		

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ment, the countries and currencies involved, and 
who pays the transaction costs. They are present 
at every stage of a transaction (from trading to 

 			_  

	 
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necessary data for tax collection and to prove 
that the tax has been paid or not paid, and where 

		
	


	-
cant extra costs.
A tax that builds on existing 
legislation to limit trade offshoring
As explained in the blueprint, the use of the 
EU-VAT legal system is a source for inspira-
tion. The Treaty provides for a broad range of ter-
ritorial connecting factors triggering the application 
of the tax. The taxable event is triggered by the 
payment of the transaction. It follows that the core 
of the tax collection is through the centralized 
clearing and settlement agencies and electronic 
trading platforms. Centralized clearing and settle-
ment agencies do not migrate easily because 
they require big infrastructures. Nevertheless, 
there is still the fear that the introduction of a tax 
will induce trading rooms, electronic platforms or 
even part of the stock exchanges and other inter-
mediaries to migrate outside the reach of collect-
ing and taxing states as described in the blueprint. 
In fact, taxing states are not powerless to enforce 
their legislation and to minimize the danger of 
migration of trading activities. For instance, we 
think possible to rely on existing legislation in the 
European Union and if necessary to use it as a 
starting point to establish a multilateral legal sys-
tem. For instance, the “Directive on Financial 
Instruments Markets”, (also known as the “Invest-
ment Services Directive”), which rules the elec-
tronic trading platforms and the “Electronic 
Commerce Directive” which rules all transactions 
on goods and services realized through Internet.
➔
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■  The “Directive on Financial Instruments Mar-
kets” is in line with the “Securities and Futures 
Authority” in the UK which has ruled since 
1996 that “advising, arranging, dealing or 
managing foreign exchange or other transac-
tions” constitutes an “investment business”.It 
means that EBS, Reuter, and other trading 
platforms are legally considered as “invest-
	

					  	
UK or in any of the EU countries to have the 
right to sell services to British or other Euro-
pean customers. Practically, it means that if 
any electronic trading platform wants to do 
business in the EU, it has to be registered at 
least in one EU member country. If the regis-
tration implies accepting and respecting the 
tax laws, it means that this electronic trading 


	
	


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tions subject to taxation. I underline that this is 
true whatever the geographical location of 
these platforms’ headquarters or trading web 
sites. Practically, it means that either each 


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site or the electronic platform has to inform the 
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
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can be taxed at the settlement site. Otherwise, 
the electronic platform loses the right to do 
business in the EU.
 
■  The “Electronic Commerce Directive”adds 
	 	 	 #	 		 		
the place of establishment as the place where 
an operator actually pursues an economic 
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spective of where web-sites or servers are 
situated or where the operator may have a 

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uncertainty and ensure that operators cannot 
evade supervision, as they will be subject to 
supervision in the member state where they 
are established.Services Providers are 
obliged “to make available to customers and 
competent authorities in an easily and acces-
sible and permanent form basic information 
concerning their activities (name, address, 
e-mail address, trade register number, profes-
sional authorisation and membership of pro-
fessional bodies where applicable, Value 
Added Tax number)”. I think that this gives a 
	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fact that there is a reference to the VAT con-
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			


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lishing the legal base of the M-FTT. The 
M-FTT will not be the mere copy of the 
European legal system, but at least it gives 
some insight on what already exists and what 
is conceivable.
2. Special topics
A treaty which can be revised 
and improved
The treaty should not be adopted on a tem-
porary basis, but should be subject to revi-
sion with the objective of improving it. This is one 
option of the blueprint which states that “The 
Treaty could be subject to revision after a trial 
period”. If we include in the text that it is possible 
to cancel the treaty after a trial period, it means 
that we are not sure that it is a good idea. It is 
							
to do it and it puts the permanence of the treaty 
at risk. It will not convince markets and investors 
either to respect the treaty and start paying the 
tax because they can bet on the fact that the 
treaty may be cancelled after a short trial period. 
On the contrary, the revision process means that 
the Treaty is here to stay but that possible prob-
	


				
The event that triggers taxation is funda-
mentally the payment of a transaction. 
Hence the fact that the collection of the tax will 
mainly realized at the clearing and settlement 
stage. But the blueprint rightly states that 
“entering into a taxable transaction” is the start 
of a taxable event. This is especially important 
	
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effectively paid because of netting. The essence 
of netting is the cancelation of payments between 
two counterparties which have made equivalent 
transactions in opposite ways to avoid the cost 
 			 
 
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
reduce up to 50 or 90 percent of the bulk of 
transactions in clearing and settlement institu-
tions. The stakes are high. Technically, it is per-
fectly possible to identify one by one each 
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of the taxable event so that legally, each transac-
tion can be taxed before it is netted. 
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Opinion: features of a practical 
and effective M-FTT
Rodney Schmidt, Phd
21 September 2011
In my opinion, it is possible, and not very 
 	
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Tax that is practical and feasible, meaning that 
evasion will be minimal, and that is effective, 
meaning that it will raise a substantial amount of 
			  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 
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markets. 
A practical and effective FTT will have a number 
of core features. It will:
■  have broad coverage, especially within an 
asset class;
■  be largely centrally collected, by clearing and 
settlement agencies and by electronic trading 
platforms;
■  have a low tax rate relative to underlying 
transaction costs; and
■  be assessed on market rather than notional 
values of derivatives.
A practical and effective FTT does not need to 
cover all asset classes, and does not need to be 
implemented by all countries or even all major 

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successfully unilaterally collects a Stamp Duty 
on only equities traded on exchanges.
The ultimate burden (incidence) of the FTT will 
be borne mostly by large dealer banks and 
hedge funds. 
Coverage
It is possible to levy an FTT on a single 
asset class, as shown by the London Stamp 
Duty on equity trading. Nevertheless, to mini-
mize economic distortions through asset substi-
tution, it is prudent to tax a broad range of assets, 
including equities, commodities, derivatives, 
bonds, money market instruments, and foreign 
exchange. This also makes it easier to collect 
the tax, since it is no longer necessary to distin-
guish between these instruments. For example, 
		
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foreign exchange transactions, than to tax both 
foreign exchange and domestic currency (money 
market) transactions, when both are settled in 
domestic Large-Value Payments Systems.
Within an asset class, such as equities, it is 
important to tax all transactions by all types of 
traders. It is easy for traders to exploit exemp-
tions by adjusting trading strategies and disguis-
ing trading intentions. Concerns to minimize the 
tax burden on retail traders and for trades directly 
related to real economy transactions are more 
effectively addressed through tax collection mecha-
nisms and the tax rate.
Closely related asset classes should all be taxed. 
For example, both equities and derivatives instru-
ments should be taxed, because they are close 
		
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
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by trading either equities or derivatives, or both. 
See below for more on taxing derivatives.
Collection
The most effective and comprehensive way 
to collect an FTT is through, and by, the cen-
tralized clearing and settlement agencies and elec-
tronic trading platforms. These agencies and 
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on-exchange and off-exchange (over-the-coun-
ter (OTC)), and are the foundation for modern 


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
In most cases, such as on exchanges, a single 
agency, the central counterparty, clears and set-
tles all trades occurring in that market. Some-
times a single agency settles all trades occurring 
on multiple exchanges. In major OTC markets, 
such as foreign exchange and most derivatives, 
it is also the case that a single agency settles 
most trades. In foreign exchange this agency is 
CLS Bank; in derivatives it is MarkitSERV.
However, in some markets, trades may be set-
tled by more than one agency. For example, in 
foreign exchange, trading may be settled either 
in CLS Bank or in domestic Large-Value Payments 
Systems. Thus, the FTT has to be collected in 
both systems. Coordinating this is not a problem, 
since a single transaction will only pass through 
one of these systems.
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‘exchanges’, electronic trading platforms, provided 
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by large dealer-broker banks. These platforms 
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because the host dealer-broker banks net out 
the vast majority (up to 95 percent) of the trades 
against each other before sending the remaining 
payment obligations on to a settlement agency. 
In this case, the host dealer-broker bank would 
collect the FTT on trading on the platform. Only 
a few banks are large enough to host such plat-
forms, so it is feasible to enforce tax collection 
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settled in one agency. That is, they are largely 
mutually exclusive, so that a single transaction 
will not normally pass through more than one of 
them. The potential to tax a transaction more 
than once is therefore not a problem in practice.
In principle, it is possible to evade a tax on equi-
ties collected at an exchange by shifting trading 
to an exchange outside of the tax jurisdiction. 
(This is not possible in the case of foreign 
exchange and some derivatives, since settle-
ment is globally centralized.) However, such 
trade-shifting can be avoided by designing the 
tax appropriately, as shown by the London 
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the tax is paid on the transaction, payment to 
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nition or protection. 
Centralized clearing and settlement agencies 
and electronic trading platforms constitute the 
fundamental infrastructure of interbank (perhaps 
now a more accurate term would be ‘wholesale’) 
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assets uses a different infrastructure, namely, 
local retail banks. Thus, using clearing and set-
tlement agencies and electronic trading plat-
forms as FTT collection points implies that the 
tax would not, in fact, be collected on most retail 
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to real economic activity.
Tax rate
The FTT is, in effect, a transaction cost, 
similar to other transaction costs, such as 
broker fees and commissions and other trading 
and settlement costs. As in any market, there is 
a relationship between transaction costs and 
trading volumes – the higher the costs, the lower 
the volumes. The FTT raises transaction costs 
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trading.
The FTT should be set at a rate that raises 
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much.  
Given a proposed tax rate, we can estimate the 
ensuing reduction in trading volume based on 
the normal response of trading to underlying 
(pre-tax) transaction costs. The key factor in 
such an estimation is the magnitude of the tax 
rate relative to underlying transaction costs. That 
is, the key is the percentage increase in transac-
tion costs due to the tax.
Underlying transaction costs are different across 


 
	
	<	
	 	
	


			
	
	
than in bond markets. This is because of differ-
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markets. As another example, transaction costs 
in equity trading organized as an auction market 
(such as the New York Stock Exchange) are 
generally smaller than in equity trading organ-
ized as a dealer market (such as the NASDAQ). 
To avoid distortions and differential impacts across 
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that is constant relative to (differing) underlying 
transaction costs. For example, it could be set at a 
rate of a third or half of underlying transaction costs 
in all markets. Then the absolute tax rate would be 
different across asset markets. Thus, for example, 
the most commonly proposed tax rates are 0,005% 
for foreign exchange markets and 0,05% for equity 
markets. 
The absolute burden of the tax on a trader in a 
given period depends, of course, on how much, 
and how often, the trader trades. Transaction 
costs in large markets are very low because 
trading volumes are so high. Trading volumes in 
interbank (wholesale) markets, dominated as 
they are by high-frequency traders, are orders of 
magnitude higher than in retail markets. So, 
again, the burden of the tax will fall most on trad-
ers in interbank markets.
Market values of derivatives  
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than others. On one hand, buying foreign 
exchange spot entails a one-time payment of 
cash. On the other hand, buying a derivative 
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entails making or receiving a payment later, 
depending on intervening movements in price or 
value of an underlying asset.  Taxing spot foreign 
exchange is straightforward. However, in the 
case of a derivative, does one only tax the pur-
chase price of the instrument (if there is one) and 
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the contract, or does one also tax the ‘notional’ 
value of the contract, the value of the underlying 
asset on which the stream of payments is based? 
This is not a question of feasibility, but of poten-
tial distortions caused by the tax. If the intention 
is to minimize substitution in trading between 
derivatives and their underlying assets because 
of the tax, then one should tax notional values of 
derivatives, since this is the equivalent basis for 
taxing trades in the underlying assets. 
However, transaction costs in derivative mar-
kets, relative to the notional value of derivatives, 
are already a fraction of costs in the underlying 
asset markets, and yet both markets co-exist. 
This is so in part because derivatives depend for 
their valuation on well-functioning markets for 
the underlying assets. Therefore, if the intention 
is to maintain current market structures, one 
should not tax notional values of derivative 
contracts.
Incidence of the FTT
Large dealer banks and hedge funds 
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transactions, using computerized, high-frequency 
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especially those dominated by high-frequency 
trading, are highly competitive and speculative, 
there is limited opportunity for dealers and hedge 
funds to pass on the cost of the tax to other, 
smaller, traders. That is, dealers and hedge 
funds compete heavily to trade with smaller 
counterparties, both to gain market share and to 
obtain market information on which to speculate 
subsequently. Therefore, ultimately dealers and 
hedge funds will likely bear most of the burden of 
the tax. 
Opinion note 
The introduction of a FTT 
– some considerations from 
a legal perspective
Michel Tison 
Financial Law Institute, Ghent University
The introduction of a FTT at a multilateral 
level is an ambitious, yet not utopian exer-
cise. Opponents to the tax do not only refer to 
policy arguments on the desirability of taxing the 
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(legal) obstacles to the introduction of a tax or 
raise doubts as to the feasibility of levying or 
enforcing a FTT at an international scale. To a 
large extent, these objections can be overcome. 
From a legal perspective, creating a multilateral 
FTT constitute a big challenge, as the FTT 
should be designed as a comprehensive, effec-
	
"				
the opportunities for tax avoidance, regulatory 
arbitrage or free-riding. The effectiveness of an 
FTT in a globalized economic environment that 
offers large opportunities for moving taxable 
transactions internationally or off-shore at a low 
cost, requires to explore the limits of territoriality 
in imposing and enforcing a FTT. Furthermore, 
the feasibility of a FTT will largely depend from 
the possibility to collect and enforce the tax at a 
low cost, in view of the peculiar nature of the FTT 
as a low-rate tax on a large volume of individu-
ally taxed transactions. This operational require-
ment should be appropriately translated into the 
legal system.
The FTT and free movement 
of capital
The introduction of an FTT could face legal 
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capital (either domestically or on a cross-border) 
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instruments more costly. Notably in the European 
Union (EU), where free movement of capital 
constitutes a fundamental and legally binding 
economic freedom, both within the EU or in rela-
tion to non EU-countries, the FTT could be 
regarded as a prohibited restriction to free move-
ment of capital. There are, however, convincing 
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arguments to maintain a FTT under the EU rules: 
although a FTT comes at a cost, the rates cur-
rently proposed are only marginal relative to the 
transaction value. Moreover, provided the tax is 
applied in a non-discriminatory manner, for both 
domestic and cross-border transactions, it does 
not, in our view, violate EU law as currently inter-
preted by the Court of Justice of the EU.
Scope of application of the FTT
There is no reason why a FTT could not be 
introduced on a broad basis, encompass-
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including derivatives, and currencies. If a FTT is 
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often with the purpose of funding development 
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which it applies allows to keep tax rates relatively 
lower. Eventually, policy makers will have to 
draw the line regarding the scope of application 
of the FTT. The effectiveness of the tax however 
commands that comparable or substitutable 
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not, the FTT could generate tax driven incen-
tives to move into non-taxed substitute invest-
ments. Furthermore, if the FTT is commonly 
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tions are not per se speculative or aimed at 
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prove extremely complex to distinguish between 
both, on the basis of objective criteria. For 
instance, entering into a derivative contract may 
serve hedging purposes, and thus be devised to 
mitigate risks. Taken in isolation, it is not possi-
ble, however, to distinguish such a transaction 
from a purely speculative one. Although levying 
the FTT will increase the cost of the hedge, we 
can assume that, due to the low rate, it will not 
have a major impact on investors’ behaviour.
The FTT is essentially targeted at secondary 
market transactions. Primary market operations 
(share and bond issues etc.) should be 
exempted, as imposing a FTT would directly 
impair on the cost of funding for enterprises put 
market operations at a competitive disadvantage 
compared to other sources of funding.
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application and possible exemptions could be 
considered, having regard to other legitimate inter-
ests or market imperatives, or to avoid multiple 
taxation of a single transaction. For instance, 
exempting central banks from the FTT when 
effecting market operations in the performance 
of monetary policy functions, appears legitimate. 
Public debt agencies could be exempted from 
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ment debt management. For centrally cleared 
transactions that involve the interposition of a 
central counterparty (CCP), a mitigation of the 
tax rate has been proposed in order not to put at 
a disadvantage centrally cleared operations in 
comparison with other types of transactions (eg 
internalization of trades). Considering the pecu-
liar position of a CCP in the transaction chain, 
the FTT system should make sure that the tax 
burden is always borne by the counterparty of 
the CCP. With a view to ensuring a uniform appli-
cation of the FTT in all participating countries, 
exemptions are best included in the treaty estab-
lishing the FTT.
Territorial reach
The treaty takes a broad view on its territo-
rial application, thereby forming a strong 
barrier against delocalization and international 
tax avoidance. The treaty is not novel in this 
regard. Other international tax rules take a broad 
view in territorial reach of the tax (enforcement) 
system as well (eg the EU savings directive, the 
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recently, the upcoming FATCA regime). Laying 
down a cascade of connecting factors for the 
application of the FTT diminishes the effective-
ness of opting-out of the FTT system for the 
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circumstance that trade is settled in a non-partic-
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from the FTT. As soon as one of the parties to a 
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in the transaction chain is located in a participat-
ing state, the FTT will be levied. Moreover, in the 
situations where the tax collection cannot be 
realized through the clearing and settlement 
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higher administrative burdens a the level of tax 
collection. This, in turn, could provide incentives 
for directing trade to markets in participating 
states, where tax collection can be centralized 
through the clearing and settlement institutions.
The territorial reach of the FTT obviously has 
limits. When there is no relevant territorial con-
necting factor in the transaction chain with a par-
ticipating state, no FTT can be imposed. The 
mere circumstance that only the issuer of the 
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derivatives) is established in a participating state 
may not lead to a situation where the issuer ulti-
mately bears the cost of the FTT.   
Taxable event and tax collection
In view of the increasing centralization of 
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derivatives, induced by various regulatory initia-
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EU), the principle to collect the FTT at the level 
of the clearing and settlement institutions is likely 
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intermediaries or end-investors. Furthermore, 
the FTT will necessarily require the adaptation of 
IT-systems, in particular if an electronic tagging 
system is introduced, that can best be imple-
mented at the level of the centralized clearing 
process. It should be stressed that the taxable 
base for the FTT will be the gross transactions 
before they enter into the clearing system, where 
mutual payments and deliveries usually are set-
tled on a net basis. In essence, the proposed 
FTT system presents characteristics of an 
accrual system, although it situates the taxable 
event at the moment of settlement.
#		



			
	
interpretation issues as to know when a transac-
tion is concluded or entered into. Deliberately, 
the FTT treaty does not attempt to mould the 
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A more functional approach could be adopted in 
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cial transaction as the relevant criterion for iden-
tifying a taxable event. The irrevocable character 
could follow from statutory rules (eg the Settle-
ment Finality Directive in the EU), from market 
regulations or contractual provisions for OTC 
transactions.
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regime. As the FTT is a low-rate tax, the sanction 
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keeping enforcement costs for tax authorities 
low. The centralization of tax collection in the 
hands of the clearing and settlement organiza-
tions, combined with existing record-keeping 
obligations in the markets will generally provide 
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cast majority of plain vanilla transactions. Link-
ing the payment (or FTT-tagging) of a transac-
tion to the eligibility for clearing and settlement 
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to comply with the FTT requirements. In other 
words, the unenforceability of the transaction 
as a sanction for non-compliance with the FTT 
is still applied within a limited time frame, thus 
avoiding a disruptive effect on normal market 
operations. Unenforceability of the transaction 
would be more disruptive, however, if the col-
lecting agent would subsequently fail to transmit 
the collected FTT to the tax authorities. Pecuni-
ary penalties could In this regard also serve as 
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FTT obligations.
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